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Historically, the United States has perceived rogue nations, unstable ally regimes, 
and terrorism as threats from the Middle East to its national security. With changing 
times, these threats require routine evaluations to ensure its validity. This thesis is a broad 
assessment of these threats as chapter one examines the effects of American coercive 
policy on the rogue nation Iran and hypothesizes that more coercive policies will make 
Iran more aggressive toward the U.S. Chapter two measures the fragility of Bahrain, one 
of America’s closest ally regimes in the Gulf, to assess its most destabilizing internal 
issues and their effect on the security of U.S. military bases there. Chapter three focuses 
on the threat of terrorism by measuring the threat of western foreign fighters to carry out 
terrorist attacks within the U.S. because there is concern among U.S. policymakers 
regarding the rising number of westerns joining the Islamic State Organization (IS) in 
Syria and Iraq. 
Chapter one assesses coercive policies toward rogue nations and finds that 
American coercive policies have resulted in more aggressive rogue nations that continue 
their nuclear program against U.S. opposition. Examining the effects of coercive foreign 
policies used toward North Korea, the U.S. should continue cooperative agreements with 
Iran to prevent further opposition. Chapter two measures the fragility of Bahrain using 
the Fragile State Index and found that Bahrain’s fragility had increased every consecutive 
year since 2011 due to three major destabilizing issues Rising instability in the country 
exacerbates the possibility that non-state groups target U.S. military installations in their 
struggle against the Al-Khalifa regime as U.S. bases have been targeted in the past. 
 
iii 
Chapter three measures western foreign fighter involvement in terrorist attacks carried 
out in the U.S. and uses the Global Terrorism database (GTD) to find that the threat of 
western foreign fighters to carry out terrorist attacks within the U.S. has been overstated 
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This thesis portfolio is a broad assessment of threats to the U.S. from the Middle 
East including rogue nations, unstable ally regimes, and terrorism and focuses on the 
threats of Iran, Bahrain’s instability, and the ability of foreign fighters to carry out 
terrorist attacks within the U.S. As rogue nations, unstable ally regimes, and terrorism are 
traditionally considered to be threats from the region, it is vital that these threats be 
regularly assessed to better ensure its validity. The first chapter answers the question, “ 
How does coercive American foreign policy affect Iran, specifically its nuclear 
program?” The second chapter measures Bahrain’s fragility to investigate the question, 
“What issues are the most destabilizing to Bahrain, and to what extent do these issues 
threaten the safety and security of U.S. bases inside the country?” The third chapter 
measures the threat of western foreign fighters by answering the question, “How likely is 
it that western foreign fighters can carry out terrorist attacks within the U.S.?”  
 
Not only does this portfolio highlight the possibility of overstatement for some of 
these threats to the U.S. but it also timely considering the recent Iranian nuclear deal and 
the continuing Middle East conflict that’s perceived as threats to U.S. interests. Iran and 
the increasing number of western foreign fighters heading to the conflict in the Middle 
East have been a major concern of the Obama Administration, Congress, and intelligence 
community. Additionally, the stability of Bahrain is a concern as it houses America’s 
primary naval headquarters in the region. While these threats continue to evolve, it is 




data—this portfolio provides that. The news media tends to focus on and heighten threats 
from the Middle East region but it is vital that policymakers and the public not be overly 
influenced by the media’s perception of what constitutes the most pressing issues faced 
by the U.S. Public opinion on these issues can be sensitive and swayed by media 
coverage so it crucial that more literature on these perceived threats be available for 
public consumption. 
 
Chapter one examines the effects of coercive U.S. foreign policy toward Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions and finds that coercive policy used toward rogue nations such as Iran 
make the country more aggressive and determined to continue its nuclear ambitions 
despite Western opposition. The chapter explores Iran’s domestic politics and discusses 
its nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism as it is referred to as a rogue state. There is 
fundamental divide within Iran between the hardliners including the Supreme leader and 
the moderates including pragmatic politicians and a large portion of its population. 
Hardliners have traditionally supported opposition toward the U.S. and nuclear 
development while the country’s citizens and moderate leaders urge the nation to mend 
relations with the West and continue nuclear negotiations. The chapter uses a 
comparative case study with N. Korea to provide policy guidance for U.S. policymakers 
and highlight ineffective policies, as Korea ultimately became a nuclear power. Although 
Iran and N. Korea differ in some ways, N. Korea provides a baseline or path forward that 
U.S. policymakers should consider when addressing policy options for rogue states such 





Peace in the Middle East has been a long-standing goal of national policymakers 
and international peace organizations for decades and has been for good reason. 
Following the Arab Spring, instability in the Middle East is concerning as its 
governments encounter problems with protecting its people and its people sometimes 
need protection from their governments. The region’s instability poses a threat to many of 
America’s allies in the region, which in turn threatens American interests. It is crucial 
that the stability of American allies in the Middle East remain under constant observation 
as many of these countries have a significant U.S. military presence within their borders. 
Chapter two measures Bahrain’s fragility to assess its most damaging issues and their 
threat to U.S. military bases. This chapter uses the Fund for Peace Fragile State Index to 
measure the fragility of Bahrain and observe its suitability for American facilities.  
 
Moving on from Iran and Bahrain, the third chapter assesses the threat of western 
foreign fighters to carry out terrorist attacks in the U.S. While a foreign fighter is 
someone who leaves their home country to fight abroad independent of their country, this 
paper focuses on western foreign fighters from the U.S. who engage in military training, 
fighting, and activities using terrorist tactics outside of the west. Using this perspective, 
the chapter measures western foreign fighter involvement in terrorist attacks carried out 
in the U.S.  
 
The first chapter’s comparative case study provided a policy baseline that U.S. 
policymakers should utilize as they aim to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 




determined to continue its nuclear ambitions despite Western opposition. This aggressive 
response suggests that more cooperative, non-coercive policies be used with Iran if the 
U.S. hopes to prevent a nuclear Iran from occurring. The second chapter measures 
Bahrain’s fragility and finds that it has increased every consecutive year since 2011, 
especially issues pertaining to state legitimacy, human rights and the rule of law, and 
group grievances. Bahraini terrorist groups have targeted security forces and U.S. 
military installations in the past, and these growing issues increase the likelihood that 
these tactics can increase in severity and occurrence as instability continues to increase. 
Additionally, Bahrain’s most destabilizing issues provide a framework that American 
policymakers can utilize when creating recommendations for the Bahraini government. 
The third chapter focuses on the threat of western foreign fighters to carry out attacks in 
the U.S. and finds that it has been overstated, as western foreign fighters have been less 
likely to successfully carry out terrorist attacks in the U.S. Using the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) database and compiling data on all terrorist attacks (jihadi inspired and 
non-jihadi inspired) that have occurred in the U.S. from 1991 and 2013 as well as a 











Every year, Gallup asks Americans which country is the U.S.’s greatest enemy 
and Americans have chosen Iran every consecutive year since 2006 until China rose 
above in 2014 followed by Russia in 2015.1 Although Americans still hold unfavorable 
views toward Iran, the country’s perceived threat among Americans has lowered in 
comparison to Russia, China, and North Korea since 2014.2 While there could a number 
of reasons for this lowered threat perception, it is reasonable to suggest that re-opened 
communication lines and nuclear negotiations play a role. Despite the recent nuclear deal 
reached by Iran, the U.S. and other P5+1 nations, members of Congress continue to fight 
the deal in favor of strengthening sanctions on the country, a coercive policy that has 
been imposed by the U.S. since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  
Assessing rouge nations such as Iran and their responses to coercive U.S. foreign 
policy would be useful for American policymakers by providing a perspective that 
policymakers can utilize to make more informed decisions on the use of sanctions to curb 
Iran’s program as well as what is more effective in preventing nations like Iran from 
obtaining nuclear weaponry. This paper examined the question, “How does coercive 
American foreign policy affect Iran, specifically its nuclear program?” It was found that 
                                                        
1 Michael Winter. USA Today, "Poll: China, not Iran, now USA's top enemy." Last modified 
February 20, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2014. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/20/china-iran-enemy-gallup-poll/5651915/. 
Jones, Jeffrey. (2015). Americans Increasingly See Russia as Threat, Top U.S. Enemy. Gallup. 






coercive foreign policy used toward Iran, particularly toward its nuclear program, made it 
more aggressive and determined to continue its nuclear ambitions despite Western 
opposition. 
Coercion is the “use of threats to influence the behavior of another (usually a 
target state but occasionally a non-state actor) by making it choose to comply rather than 
directly forcing it to comply (i.e. by brute force)” and includes tools such the threat to use 
military power and economic sanctions3. Examining America’s coercive foreign policy 
toward Iran not only helps to assess the capability of Iran to normalize relations with the 
U.S. but it is also timely as Congress debates over whether to support the nuclear deal or 
heighten sanctions. The U.S. and Iran have been enemies since the 1979 as Iran sponsors 
terrorism throughout the Middle East region. The country’s nuclear capability is another 
issue that supports unstable relations with the U.S. and great international concern. On 
July 14, 2015, U.S. negotiators announced that a nuclear deal had been reached, and 
although the U.S. currently awaits Congress’ approval, if implemented, the deal will lift 
sanctions that will expand the Iranian economy and potentially its regional influence and 
state sponsorship of terrorism. Any insight on the effects of American foreign policy 
toward Iran is useful as Congress decides whether or not to support the deal.  
 
This chapter will first discuss Iran as a rogue state, its nuclear program, and its 
domestic policy. Next, a comparative case study methodology of North Korea (N. 
Korea), another rogue nation, will be utilized to observe the effects of America’s nuclear 
policy on N. Korea to provide a baseline for a path forward with Iran. Lastly, an 
                                                        
3 Quote. Bratton, Patrick. (2005). WHEN IS COERCION SUCCESSFUL? U.S. Naval War 





indication of useful policies toward rogue nations will follow that American 
policymakers should consider when creating policy of nuclear strength toward the 
Islamic Republic. I hypothesize that coercive American policies toward Iran will make 
the regime more aggressive in its nuclear program despite Western opposition; therefore 
the U.S. should not use coercion to prevent a rogue nation from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon. 
 
Defining a Rogue State 
 
Iran, Iraq, North Korea and their allies "constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world," Bush stated as he spoke of these countries sponsoring 
terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)4. 
 
While Bush made this statement in 2002, little has changed with the exception 
Iraq as the U.S invaded the country and overthrew Saddam Hussein’s reign. 
Nevertheless, N. Korea and Iran remain sponsors of terrorism with interests in nuclear 
capability that has been of great concern to the U.S. Throughout literature and statements 
made by policymakers, Iran and N. Korea are commonly referred to as rogue states, 
exhibiting opposition to the existing “society of states” by denying or rejecting common 
interests and existing international rules and frameworks.5  These states are seen as 
threats to global peace as they seek proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs) and sponsor terrorism. Most academics agree that a rogue state has involvement 
                                                        
4 Gilmore, Gerry. (2005, March 18). United States Department of Defense News Article: Bush's 
'Axis of Evil' Speech Put Iraq on Notice. Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31166 





in terrorism, poses a military threat, challenges international norms, and seeks weapons 
or mass destruction capabilities.6  
 
While all rogue nations may exhibit the characteristics listed above, all countries 
with these characteristics may not necessarily be labeled rogue. For example, Israel and 
India both sought nuclear power despite Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
limitations so a country’s aspiration of possessing nuclear weapons is not a sole qualifier. 
Academics such as Robert Dujarric, the Director of the Institute of Contemporary Asian 
Studies, argue that a negative perception of a country’s values is a guiding factor in 
achieving this label as with authoritarian states.7 Dujarric says that while rogue states are 
negatively perceived, key rogue states all tend to be “small or medium nations that have 
achieved some success in thwarting American policy.”8 It is not merely a state’s values or 
governmental system such as authoritarian states and its violations against human rights 
alone, otherwise countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt would have label rogue states 
as well.9 The term was applied to Iran initially due to its sponsorship of terrorism as the 
country supports terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in 
Yemen, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.10 Additionally, the CIA holds that sponsorship of 
terrorism is supported by the regime as it is a way to export the revolution against 
                                                        
6 Ibid. 
7 Robert Dujarric. "North Korea: Risks and rewards of engagement." Journal of International 
Affairs- Columbia University. 54, no. 2 (2001): 465-488. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Eke, Surulola James. (2014). Rethinking US Policy Towards Iran's Nuclear Programme. 




oppressor states.11 Despite the term’s relationship with terrorism, it is significant because 
it evokes Western hostility, especially toward Iran’s uranium enrichment program.12  
 
Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
Iran has shown an interest in nuclear energy since 1957; It’s nuclear program was 
initially supported by the U.S as Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and entered an agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).13 Iran signed contracts with 
French and German firms to construct its nuclear plants and supply nuclear fuel in the 
1970’s while the U.S. provided nuclear technology, supplied nuclear reactor fuel, 
supported Iranian scientists, and supervised the construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear 
station under the Shah’s regime.14 Although the U.S. supported its program in the 
beginning, support began to decline “after U.S. intelligence forces suggested in 1974 that 
the Shah’s ambitions could lead Iran to pursue nuclear weapons.”15 
 
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and Iran-Iraq War, the view of the U.S 
drastically changed.16 Iran continued its program in the early 1990’s until it suspended it 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 50. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "A History of Iran's Nuclear Program." A History 
of Iran's Nuclear Program. http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-
background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program (accessed May 6, 2014). 
14 Eke, Surulola James. (2014). Rethinking US Policy Towards Iran's Nuclear Programme. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "A History of Iran's Nuclear Program." A History 
of Iran's Nuclear Program. http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-




again in 2003 when the IAEA discovered its uranium enrichment capabilities.17 It 
restarted operations again in 2005, and in 2006, the U.N. Security Council imposed 
sanctions after Iran refused to stop its enrichment. Iran began negotiations in 2009, 
although it has consistently refused to give up its enrichment programs.18 In 2012, the 
IAEA reported high stockpiles of enriched uranium sparking international pressure 
resulting in current negotiations.  
 
Iran’s Domestic Politics 
 
To understand Iran’s foreign policy and the American response, an examination 
of Iran’s domestic politics should be made. Although Iranian politics are not as 
transparent as democracies, literature notes that a political separation between Iranian 
elites exist over the “fundamental difference of whether the country should continue as a 
rouge state willing to defy the world, or whether it should settle down and become a 
normal state that plays by international rules.”19 This same political division is illustrated 
among Iranian policymakers who support and oppose the nuclear deal. President Rouhani 
has made significant liberal policy proposals and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei has spoken of “heroic flexibility” as he stated that Iran is20  
“not against proper and rational diplomatic moves, be it in the diplomatic sphere, 
or the sphere of domestic politics…your servant believes in what was coined 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "A History of Iran's Nuclear Program." 
19 Shahram Chubin. The United States Institute of Peace, "The Politics of Iran's Nuclear 
Program." Accessed March 10, 2014. http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-
program. 
20 Bridget Marie Heing, Iranian Democracy: A Century of Struggle, Setback, and Progress. (PhD 




years ago: ‘heroic flexibility.’  Flexibility is necessary on certain occasions. It is 
very beneficial.” 21 
 
Despite President Rouhani’s progressive attempts, Iranian hardliners have 
consistently pushed back.22 Amid the nuclear negotiation, Iranian headlines noted the 
growing criticism among Rouhani’s right-wing opponents and activists who claimed 
Iran’s nuclear negotiating team continuously ignored the country’s national interest.23 
Iran’s hierarchy and the “intractability of the defenders of Iran’s religious orthodoxy 
[hardliners]—among them the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have been an 
obstacle.”24 
 
The most important and powerful figure in Iran is Supreme Leader, Khamenei, and 
although he has made reformist statements in support of President Rouhani, he has never 
delineated away from his role of Supreme Leader (i.e. Leader of the Revolution) and has 
blocked reformist policy in many cases. Khamenei remained somewhat neutral during the 
nuclear talks but addressed six redlines that Iran’s nuclear negotiators could not cross 
including: 
1. Iran’s “scientific and nuclear movement should not be stopped in any way or 
slowed down;” 
                                                        
21 Tehran Bureau, “Iran: Hello diplomacy, so long Martyrdom.” Last modified Sept. 21, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/sept21/iran-heroic-flexibility-diplomacy-
martyrdom. 
22 Bridget Marie Heing, Iranian Democracy: A Century of Struggle, Setback, and Progress. 
23 Quote Simon Tisdall. "Hassan Rouhani faces growing criticism in Iran over nuclear talks." 
theguardian.com. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/04/hassan-rouhani-iran-nuclear-
talks (accessed May 4, 2014). 






2. Tehran’s negotiators must insist on the continuation of nuclear advancement, 
research, and development; 
3. No one has the right trade the country’s nuclear achievements and no one will do 
so; 
4. “Officials must be vigilant in regards to the defense of nuclear achievements;” 
5. Iran’s negotiators should not accept bullying from the other side;  





Iran’s changing demographics are another influential aspect of the country’s 
political atmosphere. The majority of its population is under the age of 30 and shares a 
completely different perspective than the very small group of clerics who founded the 
Republic in 1979.26 The younger generation tends to be more liberal or reformist, as they 
grew up during the 1990’s, a period when Iranians pushed back against rigid restrictions 
such as dress code.27 Additionally, the election of moderate Rouhani and his 
accomplishments thus far “reflects a level of pragmatism for which Iran is often not given 
credit.28” Not to mention the previous election of former Iranian president Mohammad 
Khatami who received a large 70 percent of the public vote, as he similar to Rouhani 
supported a more reformist platform in 1997.29 A majority of Iranians have shown 
                                                        
25 The United States Institute of Peace. "The Iran Primer: Khamenei’s Red Lines on Nuclear 
Talks." Khamenei's Red Lines on Nuclear Talks. 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/apr/16/khamenei%E2%80%99s-red-lines-nuclear-talks 
(accessed May 1, 2014). 
26 Bridget Marie Heing, Iranian Democracy: A Century of Struggle, Setback, and Progress.102. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. Heing, Iranian Democracy. 100. 
29 Encyclopedia Britannica, "Mohammad Khatami." Last modified August 23, 2013. Accessed 




support for reformist presidents as the 2013 presidential election received high voter 
turnout of 73 percent, and Rouhani secured 50.7 percent of the popular vote while the 
second contender only received 16 percent.30 Even considering the reelection of Iranian 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and its resulting protests illustrates a public Iranian 
support for reform as Ahmadinejad was highly conservative with low approval ratings 
 
As new generations assume positions of power within the government, the 
potential for change is more likely. When one reminisces on Iranian-U.S. past relations 
and the overthrow of its democratically elected leader Mossadegh in 1953, democracy is 
not guaranteed but remains an option. In addition to a more liberal and younger 
generation, Iranian public opinion has shown “less support for the nuclear program” over 
time.31 Not only do Iranians believe that the pursuit of nuclear weapons impedes their 
desire for peace but they also make distinctions between weaponization and nuclear 
technology.32  While the majority of Iranians believe that access to nuclear technology it 
is a national right, they also believe that nuclear weapons would make Iran less safe.33 
 
Historical Policy Review  
 
                                                        
30 Bozorgmehr, Shirzad, and Michael Martinez. "Hassan Rouhani is Iran's next president after 
appealing to tradition, reform." CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/15/world/meast/iran-
elections/ (accessed May 4, 2014). 
31 Michael Herzog. "Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program A Potential Asset for the 
International Community." Policy Focus: 3-6. 






Throughout historical and academic literature, various examinations of U.S.-
Iranian relations have been made as well as recommended policies toward Iran. Although 
the U.S. forced regime change in Iran and overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime 
Minister Mossadegh in the 1953’ coup d’etat, it has traditionally used a policy of 
containment against the country since 1979.34 Containment is a policy that aims to stop 
the expansion of an enemy state or the expansion of its influence as Executive Vice 
President of the Brookings Institution Martin Indyk discusses America’s support of Sunni 
countries in the region in opposition to the Shiite Iran. By supporting Saudi Arabia, 
Israel, and Turkey, the U.S. has created a strong balance against Iran in the region.35 The 
U.S. has strengthened ties to the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations as well as 
increased arms and fighter aircraft sales to states in the region.36 As these states are 
neighbors of Iran, many of them house military bases that “supply an embryonic skeleton 
for any future regional security structure that could be used to contain the threat posed by 
a potentially nuclear Iran.”37 
 
Within the U.S.’ policy of containment, the use of sanctions to weaken Iran has 
been an integral staple of U.S. coercive policy in hopes that its population would rise 
against the theocratic regime. There have been continuous sanctions placed on Iran since 
its revolution when the country’s estimated 12 billion worth of assets were frozen in 
                                                        
34 Korb, Lawrence. J. (2010). The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward. Bulletin Of The 
Atomic Scientists, 66(6), 95-101. doi:10.1177/0096340210387502 
35 Ibid. 
36 GOLDMAN, Zachary. K., & RAPP-HOOPER, M. (2013). Conceptualizing Containment: The 
Iranian Threat and the Future of Gulf Security. Political Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell), 
128(4), 590. doi:10.1002/polq.12139 




November 1979.38 It was later followed by a U.S. ban to export or import any goods or 
services from Iran in 1987 and in 2005, the assets of any individual with ties to Iran’s 
nuclear program was frozen.39 While other countries such as Australia, India, Canada, 
South Korea, Switzerland, and the European Union followed suit, the United Nations 
Security Council imposed a resolution that “prohibited the supply of nuclear-related 
materials and technology to Iran and also froze the assets of individuals connected with 
Iran’s nuclear program.”40 
 
Iran and the U.S. are both responsible for unstable relations as Lawrence Korb, a 
senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information, observed American’s historical 
policy toward Iran and noted instances in which the U.S. undermined Iran stabilization 
including (1) the Iranian coup d’etat; (2) supporting the Iraqi invasion of Iran in the 
1980s and not condemning Saddam Hussein’s for his use of chemical weapons (3) 
referring to Iran as an axis of evil under the Bush Administration despite their 
cooperation and assistance with ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan; (4) undermining 
America’s position on nuclear proliferation by allowing Israel and India to house nuclear 
weapons in the region without signing the NPT.41 Korb says the U.S. should 
acknowledge its past decisions and the role it’s played in the Iranian perspective against 
America. He says that the U.S. should remain open to nuclear negotiations with Iran 
while maintaining a policy of containment, as it proved useful during the Cold War.42  
 
                                                        
38 Eke, Surulola James. (2014). Rethinking US Policy Towards Iran's Nuclear Programme, 47. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 47-48. 





Recommended Policy Review  
 
Aside from containment strategies, Henry Kissinger recommended an interesting 
policy option for rogue nations that has yet to be utilized by the U.S. toward Iran. 
Although the U.S. has continuously used coercive policies to include the threat of 
military force toward Iran’s nuclear program, there has never been war between the two 
countries, although the U.S’ supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq against the Islamic 
Republic. Kissinger recommends war as the best option for rogue states that intend to 
destroy the established international order as his theory groups the global order into two 
camps including status quo powers and opposition states including rogue nations. He 
holds that status quo powers interact with countries such as Iran by forcing them to adapt 
to familiar frameworks that these countries fail to see as legitimate.43 He says war is the 
most permanent policy option when handling rogues states.44 With war, regime change 
can be forced.  While Kissinger has not explicitly stated that U.S. should go to war with 
Iran, his theory recommends war as a permanent option for rogue nations such as Iran. As 
the U.S. recuperates from conflict fatigue as a result of the Iraqi invasion, the use of 
sanctions toward Iran have been overwhelmingly supported by the American public 
rather than war.   
 
Historian Daniel Larison disagrees that containment and war are good policy 
options for Iran and argues that a negotiated settlement and more non-coercive policies 
                                                        
43 Kaplan, Robert. "Living With a Nuclear Iran." The Atlantic. N.p., 11 Aug 2010. Web. 10 Feb 
2014. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/living-with-a-nuclear-
iran/308193/>. 






toward Iran would prove more useful in getting the country to give up its nuclear 
program.45 In light of the recent nuclear deal and the previous ongoing nuclear 
negotiations that extended three deadlines and undergone four extensions since 2013, 
Larison’s suggestion for negotiation was effective in reaching a deal despite some 
policymakers pushing for coercive sanctions throughout the negotiation. The current 
nuclear deal aims to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon for another ten years.  
 
Despite containment strategies and economic sanctions used on Iran, the 
country’s nuclear program continues to gain international concern pertaining to its 
proximity to nuclear weaponry. Those in Congress against a deal along with foreign allies 
in the Middle East region hold the deal as a play for time that will allow Iran to expand 
its influence and supply greater sponsorship to terrorism and convert means to a nuclear 
weapon. Another concern of a nuclear capable Iran is the possibility of nuclear weapons 
and technology getting into the hands of non- state terrorist organizations as Iran a state 
sponsor of terrorism to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Ariel Ilan Roth support that 
Iran is a rational state actor that can be trusted with a nuclear weapon, other ‘nuclear 
pessimists’ view Iran as an irrational actor with a theocratic dictatorship, untrustworthy 
of responsible nuclear possession, thereby threatening MAD deterrence.46  
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One thing is clear, a nuclear Iran challenges regional stability and can spur 
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East as neighboring states, especially Saudi Arabia, 
have shared concerns and plans to compete to maintain better enhance their security. 
Considering the pre-emptive nature of the U.S. ally Israel, Israeli airstrikes against Iran 
could pull the U.S. into another Middle Eastern conflict. While there are various threats 
posed by a nuclear seeking and capable Iran, the current deal, although awaiting 
Congressional and Iranian acceptance is a step closer toward resolving this issue. 
 
Comparative Case Study  
Whether the U.S. decides to implement the nuclear deal or reject it to continue 
sanctions, it must seriously assess the effects of U.S. coercive policies on Iran to 
determine the most effective options to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.  One 
comparative example is N. Korea as it too engaged in nuclear negotiations with the U.S. 
and is labeled as a rogue state. Evaluating the historical policy used toward N. Korea and 
its effects can provide a baseline for observing effective or ineffective policies for rogue 
nations engaged in nuclear negotiations with the U.S.  
 
While N. Korea is a communist state under the rule of dictator Kim Jong Un, Iran 
is an theocratic republic with the Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei who has more 
power than the Iranian president and legislative branch.47 Unlike N. Korea, the U.S. once 
shared strong relations with Iran following the 1953 coup d’etat until 1979, but its 
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relations with N. Korea have been strained relations since the end of WWII when the 
Soviet Union occupied N. Korea.48  While both countries are known as rogue and axis of 
evil countries, both have also heightened international concern pertaining to nuclear non-
proliferation. Iran has never publicized an interest in obtaining a nuclear weapon and 
claims that it is only interested in nuclear energy while N. Korea has publicized and even 
leveraged its nuclear weapon capabilities for concessions. 
  
N. Korea has advanced its nuclear weapon capability since the 1990’s and 
intended to withdraw from the NPT in 1993.49 Following its publicized intent to 
withdraw, it entered into an Agreed Framework with the U.S. to receive aid in exchange 
for freezing its illegal plutonium program; nevertheless, the program collapsed in 2002 
and N. Korea officially announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003.50  N. Korea and 
Iran both entered into negotiations over its nuclear program in return for concessions with 
N. Korea requesting aid and light water nuclear energy construction and Iran requesting 
economic sanction alleviation.51  
  
Scott Synder, the Director of the program on U.S.- Korea policy at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, finds that N. Korea followed a ‘crisis oriented negotiation style’ that 
used its nuclear potential and threats as a bargaining chip; it requests non-aggressive 
pacts and bilateral agreements with the U.S. and a normalization of relations while the 
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U.S. demands multilateral agreements and disarmament before normalization52. Roland 
Bleiker, a professor of International relations and Korean politics at the University of 
Queensland, notes that U.S. behavior was also threatening throughout the negotiations 
including America’s placement of nuclear weapons in South Korea near the northern 
border; nuclear weapons training exercises in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); and threats 
of pre-emptive strikes made during the Bush Administration.53 In 2000, U.S.-Iran talks 
covered nuclear transparency and normalization as President Clinton weighed the option 
to go visit the country.54 When President Bush took office in 2001, the atmosphere 
changed as the new administration was more skeptical and worried about nuclear 
verification which sparked increased N. Korean opposition.55 Tensions continued to grow 
as Bush referred to the nation as an axis of evil in 2002 and N. Korea began to use 
threatening rhetoric as a result until later that year, a N. Korea clandestine nuclear 
weapons program was discovered which violated the framework agreement.56 
 
Bleiker notes that N. Korea seemed more cooperative during the first nuclear 
crisis in 1992 but as the U.S. became more aggressive, it become more antagonistic 
leading up until its public announcement to continue its nuclear ambitions along with a 
return of hostile rhetoric in 2002.57 Overall, N. Korea seeks to maintain its nuclear power 
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as a deterrent against attacks and uses its nuclear power as a bargaining chip.58 Although 
it is unknown whether N. Korea fully intended to continue nuclear weapon intentions 
throughout the talks, one must not ignore the use of American coercion toward N. Korea 
resulted in heightened opposition from N. Korea and a nuclear N. Korean state.  
 
The Iranian situation differs from N. Korea in that the U.S. initially supported 
Iran’s nuclear program and supplied the country with its first nuclear reactor, the Tehran 
Research Reactor or TRR, in 1967.59 While it supported Iran’s program under Shah 
Pahlavi, it switched stances after the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis of 1979. Iran 
halted its nuclear program after the revolution but continued to acquire nuclear 
technology on the black market from the Abdul Qadeer Khan Network (i.e. a Pakistan 
based network headed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear 
program) in 1987.60 The U.S. Congress passed the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act 
in 1992 which prohibited support of Iran’s proliferation of advanced weapons and the 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (or the Iran Sanctions Act) in 1996 which prohibited any 




Although it has not been publically confirmed whether Iran seeks nuclear weapon 
capability, the U.S. Institute of Peace, stated that Iran’s nuclear program is an “attempt to 
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become more self-reliant in arms and technology” and is “ a byproduct of the troubled 
revolution’s omnipresent need for legitimacy and Iranian nationalism’s quest for respect 
and international status.”  Despite Iran public objection to nuclear weaponry, it has 
sparked concern in the international community, notably the U.S., China, France, 
Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA).62 Although coercive sanctions placed against the regime have negatively 
impacted its economy, Iran has continued to advance its nuclear capabilities. 
 
Khamenei spoke of the existence of sanctions and international pressure on 
Tehran for false reasons of human rights violations and nuclear achievements and notes 
that the West “will always find an excuse, therefore the only way is to continue our 
[Iran’s] path of progress with complete power is to stand up against their [Western] 
bullying.”63  Although the sanctions have crippled Iran’s economy, they have been 
ineffective in changing the country’s nuclear drive, and Iran has even spoken of creating 
an ‘economy of resistance” that would neutralize the effects of sanctions.64 Considering 
this, Larison’s suggestion to use non-coercive methods against Iran to settle the nuclear 
dispute may be more effective than U.S’ coercive policy thus far. 
 
Taking N. Korea’s past negotiations into account, negotiated settlements failed to 
prevent the country from obtaining a nuclear weapon, which was the ultimate goal of the 
U.S. It is important to note that despite the nuclear talks, the U.S. never took coercion off 
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the table as Bleiker notes the use of U.S. military intimidation which could have 
negatively affected the N. Korean perspective aside from its initial intentions. Although it 
is unknown whether N. Korea fully intended to be a nuclear power or sought only nuclear 
capability, initially, the U.S.’ use of coercive negotiations resulted in a nuclear enemy. 
With that being said, the comparative study with N. Korea illustrates that coercive U.S. 
policy toward the rogue nation failed. The study also provides two options that the U.S. 
has not previously utilized against rogue nations with nuclear ambitions including (1) 
pure non-coercive negotiations and (2) brute force. No one knows for certain which 
option would ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon, but this comparative case 
study does identify the ineffectiveness of coercive negotiation policies such as those used 
with N. Korea in preventing nuclear acquisition. As some in Congress call for coercive 
sanctions rather than a nuclear deal, policymakers should consider policies based on 
historical failures to avoid making the same mistakes.  Einstein once stated that the 
definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a 
different result, and policymakers should take heed. 
  
The Path Forward 
 
 
Looking to the statements made by Khamenei and other Iranian conservative 
hardliners, one idea is evident, although Iran has reopened communication, Khamenei has 
repeatedly stated that Iran will not tolerate bullying or coercion from Western states. 
Khamenei’s warning should be regarded with caution considering that past coercive 




could be more effective policy options toward rogue states when settling nuclear 
program/ambition concerns. Although some policy strategists such as Kissinger note that 
war is an effective option to change the policy of states like Iran, a lack of public support 
coupled with the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq have made the option 
of war (or use of brute force) less likely. Larison’s idea of long-term cooperative 
negotiations with Iran is the best option learning from past failures in preventing rogue 
nations from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This includes financial coercion also as 
Khomeini made his stance clear in the midst of Iran’s faltering economy that the effects 
of sanctions cannot be a guiding force when assessing Iranian policy and can be counter-
acted by building relations with non-western partners such as China and increasing self-
sufficiency.65  
 
Iran seems to be more cooperative when negotiated settlement policy options are 
utilized rather than coercion. Based on N. Korea, utilizing coercive policies toward a 
rogue Iran is a risk that can result in a more determined Iran that seeks to enhance its 
nuclear capability; further solidifying the threat it poses to American interests and allies 
in the Middle East. Considering the progress achieved with the nuclear deal and Iran’s 
adherence to the restrictions of the interim deal that was implemented during negotiations 
that limited its uranium enrichment and redesigned “its Arak heavy water reactor to 
greatly limit the amount of plutonium it can make, [which is] a major concession,” 
cooperation between the U.S. and Iran is not an impossible idea to consider. 66  
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Discussing Iran’s responses to coercive American foreign policy is important as 
the country funds terrorism; has been perceived as an enemy of the U.S. since1979; and 
houses nuclear capabilities that are of great concern. Looking to comparative examples 
such as N. Korea, another rogue nation with concerning nuclear ambitions, U.S. policy 
makers can learn from past negotiation styles and policies. The example of N. Korea 
provides policy guidance seeking to prevent rogue nations from acquiring nuclear 
weapon capabilities and provides a baseline for policies there were ineffective in stopping 
N. Korea from obtaining nuclear weaponry. Whenever the U.S. used coercion throughout 
the talks, the more aggressive N. Korea became in opposition to the U.S. and in support 
of its nuclear program until it eventually achieved nuclear status. As Iran, the U.S. and 
other P5+1 nations have reached a nuclear deal, continued cooperative policies should be 
used as coercive policies such as sanctions can strengthen the country’s opposition and 





Chapter Two. Bahraini Fragility: An Assessment of Bahrain’s Stability 




In March 2014, news media covered stories of Americans calling on the United 
States government for assistance in fleeing Yemen as domestic conflict continued to rise 
as a result of fighting between the Sunni al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the 
Islamic State Organization, and the Shiite Houthi rebels.67 While there were no American 
military bases in Yemen, there were some American forces located on the Yemen al-
Annad air base. Unfortunately, the Department of State (DOS) reported that it was too 
dangerous to evacuate its citizens from Yemen.68 Although the United States’ evacuated 
its embassy personnel in February, some military personnel stayed behind. Early warning 
systems for regional instability are vital in ensuring that U.S. personnel are safe in 
countries with rising violence and domestic conflict.  
In 2014, U.S. House Representative Hank Johnson, member of the Armed 
Services committee, stated that the instability and resulting violence in Bahrain is a threat 
to the U.S. military assets and personnel stationed there.69 This paper examines the 
instability of Bahrain and the question, “What issues are the most destabilizing to 
Bahrain, and to what extent do they threaten the safety and security of American bases 
there?” By measuring Bahrain’s fragility, this chapter finds that its most destabilizing 
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issues pertain to (1) state legitimacy, (2) human rights and the rule of law, and (3) group 
grievances; these issues will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. As Bahraini 
terrorist and opposition groups have targeted security forces and U.S. military 
installations in the past, these growing destabilizing issues can increase the likelihood 
that violence between security and resistance groups will follow.  
 
The U.S. became heavily involved in the Middle East during WWII, mainly in 
competition against the Soviet Union, and has maintained relationships with a number of 
Middle Eastern countries to include member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). The GCC is made up of six member states to include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).70 The U.S. maintains strong 
security cooperation with Bahrain as it was designated a Major non-NATO ally (MNNA) 
in 2002.71  Bahrain, home to the U.S’ Naval Fifth Fleet and Naval, shares close military 
cooperation with U.S. defense forces, and engages in large arms trade with the U.S.72 
Bahrain is important in maintaining our interests in the region and its instability is a 
concern that could impact its suitability to house a U.S. Naval Headquarters.  
 
This chapter will first define state fragility before providing a brief explanation of 
Bahrain’s importance to the U.S., especially as a military host country. Next, an academic 
literature review will discuss the major theoretical causes for instability in the Middle 
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East, and a methodology portion will examine Bahrain’s instability using the Fund for 
Peace Fragile State Index. The chapter will come to a conclusion after discussing the 
results of the index and overviewing the threat that its most destabilizing issues pose to 
U.S. bases. 
 
State Fragility and Suitability 
This chapter measures Bahrain’s fragility to determine the most destabilizing 
issues within Bahrain and their threat to the security of American bases. Before a 
measurement of fragility can be made, a comprehensive definition of the term is needed. 
While international recognition and defined borders are vital characteristics, a state must 
have a sovereign and legitimate governing authority. A state cannot be politically subject 
to another state and its government must be accepted by its population as the proper 
source of authority; this is what is meant by state sovereignty and governing legitimacy.73 
Governing bodies and leaders should have the basic legitimacy to rule, and state 
institutions should provide basic functions. In order for a government to govern its people 
and guard its borders, it must have the capacity and the support to do so, without which 
destabilization or aspects of state fragility can prosper. States are fragile when its 
“structures lack the political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed 
for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of 





their populations.”74  State fragility can further catalyze issues such as organized crime, 
violence, terrorist activity, armed conflict, etc.75  
 
For the purpose of this chapter, state suitability is used to assess a country that 
houses American bases and helps to answer the question of to what extent Bahrain’s most 
destabilizing issues threaten the safety and security of U.S. military personnel and bases. 
Suitability focuses on the likelihood that these entities are targeted for violent or terrorist 
attacks. If U.S. military bases and personnel are routinely targeted within a host country, 
the host country is not suitable to house it. A suitable host country is stable and tends not 
to experience high targeting of U.S. bases or military personnel. By measuring Bahrain’s 
fragility and its potential for further exacerbating internal conflict such as increasing 
government opposition groups and sectarianism, one can better assess the safety of U.S. 
personnel and bases there. 
 
America has multiple interests in the Gulf region as it is not only home to a third 
of the world’s natural gas reserves and half of the world’s oil reserves but it houses the 
Strait of Hormuz, a significant trade route.76 The region also has growing financial 
powers that have gained importance in America’s international trade and investment 
sphere.77 Bahrain has shared a free trade agreement with the U.S. since 2006.78 While the 
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U.S. seeks to maintain some level of security cooperation with its closest GCC allies, the 




The U.S. established relations with Bahrain in 1971 after it declared independence 
from the United Kingdom and held an American naval headquarters there since 1948.79 
U.S.-Bahrain security cooperation evolved over the decades “in large part to keep 
Bahrain’s powerful neighbors in check, and Bahrain has placed its facilities at U.S. 
disposal to address threats from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, international terrorism, and 
piracy in the Gulf and Arabia Sea.”80  
 
As previously mentioned that Bahrain is a close ally of the GCC, the GCC is a 
political and economic union of Gulf States and have traditionally been key partners of 
the U.S. in balancing the region against Iran and Iraq.81 Although there is military 
cooperation between the U.S. and all six GCC member states, the U.S. has only 
designated Bahrain and Kuwait with MNNA status.82 While MNNA designation does not 
secure the same security guarantees such as mutual defense that North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) members receive, is only given to close allies with strong strategic 
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working relationships with American defense forces.83 Not only are MNNA countries 
eligible for “certain kinds of military assistance with less restrictions on weapon sales but 
these countries can also participate in cooperative defense research and development 
projects that are typically not available to non-NATO countries.84  
 
Bahrain is a majority Shiite kingdom ruled under Sunni King Hamad bin Isa Al 
Khalifa. The country’s Sunni ruling elite has caused tension with its Shiite majority 
population while Shiites are not adequately represented within the Council of 
Representatives (COR), the lower house of Bahrain’s government and have long 
complained of discrimination.85 These tensions increased following the elections of 2002, 
2006, and 2010 when a Sunni majority was appointed to the COR.86 Protests increased 
following accusations toward the government for gerrymandering voting districts to 
support Sunni candidates and after 23 Shiite leaders were arrested under an anti-terrorism 
law.87  
 
Following the toppling of President Mubarak in Egypt in 2011, large demonstrations 
took place calling for Al Khalifa to step-down or hand more power over to the parliament 
(or COR).88 When demonstrations continued to grow, the Bahraini government requested 
support from its Sunni GCC neighbors who sent troops to help subdue the demonstrations 
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leaving at least seven protestors dead.89 The White House urged Bahrain to “exercise 
maximum restraint, condemn the use of excessive force and indiscriminate use of tear gas 
against protestors [which had been a cause of civilian casualties],” and to engage in an 
open dialogue with opposition parties.90 Despite this, Human Rights Watch and Bahrain’s 
Shiite Opposition groups blamed the U.S. for going easy on the use of excessive force 
that left protestors dead.91 
 
Bahrain houses ten U.S. defense facilities with over 8,500 Americans.92 According to 
the Department of Defense (DOD), the facilities include: 
1. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, 
2. NSA Bahrain Aviation Unit Muharraq, 
3. NSA Bahrain Banz Wrhs Compound, 
4. NSA Bahrain Dependent School,  
5. NSA Bahrain Mina Sulman Pier Area, 
6. Nsa-il 
7. Sheik Isa, and 
8. 3 other unidentified sites93. 
 
NSA-Bahrain is the headquarters for America’s Fifth Fleet, which facilitates maritime 
activity in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and much of 
the waters off eastern Africa since 1995.94 NSA-Bahrain base is expensive and currently 
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undergoing an estimated $580 million construction program that will double the size of 
the facility by adding new administration buildings, barracks, warehousing, and dining 
facilities by 2017.95  A previous construction program expanded the Shaykh Isa Airbase 
(or Sheik Isa) to increase its storage space for more surveillance aircrafts, and another 19 
million was spent to “for a U.S. Special Operations Forces facility.”96 Additionally, the 
base continues to increase its number of minesweepers (i.e. mine-sweeping helicopters) 
and coastal patrol ships to combat illegal trafficking across the Arabian Sea.97  
Considering the increasing costs to expand U.S. bases in Bahrain, the country’s stability 
should be assessed to not only warn against the possibility that American defense forces 
could be expelled but to also gauge the safety for Americans in the country. 
 
Defense Secretary Hagel noted contingency planning for Bahrain in the possibility 
that “threats to U.S. personnel, instability of Bahrain’s government, or the accession of a 
new regime that expels the U.S. presence” occurs.98 Although it is has not been 
confirmed by the DOD, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) named likely 
contingency sites for America’s Naval headquarters to include Kuwait’s Shuaiba Port, 
Qatar’s New Doha Port, or the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s Jelbel Ali space.99 Despite 
contingency planning, the increased spending on construction projects in Bahrain is a 
concern. 
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Historical Instances of American Forces Forced Out 
History identifies instances when American forces were forced out of foreign 
countries by either a foreign government consensus or rising domestic instability 
including the U.S.’ expulsion from the Philippines in 1991 and the evacuations from 
Yemen in 2015. While the Philippine government peacefully enforced America’s exit, a 
forced evacuation was implemented in Yemen, due to safety concerns, resulted from 
increasing violence between non-state groups.  On December of 1991, the Philippine 
government served the United States a one- year notice to withdraw completely from the 
Subic Bay Naval Base.100 The notice to evacuate resulted from Philippine government 
disagreements over U.S. economic aid and the Subic Bay lease treaty. A year does not 
force immediate evacuation of U.S troops, but a year may not be enough time to replace 
such a strategic naval base. The Subic Naval Base was a supply and ship repair 
installation.101 While there are no American bases in the Philippines, there are 32 military 
personnel located at an unidentified location in the Philippines.102 Although there are no 
American defense facilities in Yemen, the DOD does report to have some military 
personnel in an unidentified location.103  Although rising tensions in Yemen led to a 
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“relocation of the U.S. embassy staff from the Capitol City of Sanaa for safety 
precautions, a number of military personnel were left behind, some to help train Yemen’s 
forces against rival groups.104 
 
Literature Review 
Theories for the Growth of State Fragility in the Middle East 
Academic literature provides various causes for instability in the Middle East but 
this literature review will outline the three most occurring theories for the region. One 
theoretical cause focuses on the policy failures of western country intervention seeking to 
contain the conflict. John Bew, Director of the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence, noted how the U.S. became so entrenched in the 
region that once it began pulling out it created a vacuum that regional states are 
attempting to fill.105 The competition to fill this vacuum has only worsened the situation. 
Additionally, the Sykes-Picot protocol, crafted by Britain and France, divided the Middle 
Eastern region up by drawing many of the state borders seen today. While the Sykes-
Picot protocol failed to reach to the island now known as Bahrain, non-state organizations 
such as the Islamic State Organization hope to form a caliphate that eliminates those very 
borders and have increased sectarian tensions that transcend Bahrain’s borders today.106 
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Another theoretical cause is the failure of state institutions in the region. Brian 
Dooley, Director for Human Rights First Defenders Program, notes the insufficiency of 
some Middle East state institutions to adequately provide for its population. This 
explanation finds that instability in the region 
“stems from long-simmering problems that undermined state institutions and 
provoked widespread discontent among youthful, more mobilized populations. 
The parts of the region that are most disordered today are those where leaders, 
having rejected reforms and provoked popular uprisings, then sought to repress 
their angry citizens through overwhelming force. As the state turned against its 
own citizens, and as institutions of basic governance and community order failed, 
sectarian militias, terrorism, and civil war filled the void.”107 
 
Additionally, a third theoretical cause is sectarianism and ethnic tension in the region.  
Former Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad, Murat Ozcelik notes that radical Shia and 
Sunni jihadist groups, with distorted views of Islam, exploit these tensions to increase 
political influence and leverage in the region.108 Sectarianism, or discrimination between 
radical Sunni and Shia factions have been “fomented and further exacerbated by 
respective state backing of Iran and Saudi Arabia” and has further destabilized the 
Middle East.109 
 
These theories are interesting when examining the state fragility of Bahrain and 
its effect on U.S. bases there. While one theory places the blame for Middle East 
instability on domestic institutions, another focuses on Western intervention, while a 
third blames sectarianism. While there could be numerous reasons for a state’s instability, 
                                                        
107 Quote. Cofman, Tamara. (2015, March 2). America's allies in the Middle East create as many 
problems as they solve. Retrieved July 5, 2015, from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-
from-chaos/posts/2015/03/02-friends-americas-allies-middle-east-create-problems-solve-wittes 
108 Ozcelik, Murat. The Two Radical Sources of Instability in the Middle East. (2014, August 15). 





these three causes were the most reoccurring throughout literature. This paper touches on 
all three perspectives as the Fragile State Index used to measure Bahrain’s fragility 
observes issues such as Bahraini institution failures, sectarian/ethnic tension, and foreign 
intervention. All of these aspects are vital when examining Bahrain’s suitability for a 
U.S. presence and military base. 
 
Methodology 
This examination will measure the state fragility of Bahrain using the Fragile 
State Index, previously known as the Failed State Index, which is an annual ranking 
system of “nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face.110 While 
this index measures normal pressures that all states face to include issues with 
demographic pressures (e.g. natural disasters, pollution, disease, etc.), group grievance 
(e.g. discrimination, ethnic violence, etc.), and others, it aims to measure or predict when 
certain pressures begin to push “a state toward the brink of failure.”111  Using the index’s 
scores and top indicators (i.e. destabilizing issues), Bahrain will be observed since 2005, 
the index’s inception, to help determine its largest issues and suitability for U.S. bases. 
 
The index uses a Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) to analyze 12 issue 
areas within a state’s social, economic, political, and military realms to determine which 
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pressures are the most destabilizing.112 Full descriptions of all 12 indicators are provided 
in Appendix A. This examination will only identify Bahrain’s indicators with the highest 
three scores to assess its role in the country’s fragility. Individual indicator scores can 
range between zero to ten, with zero meaning most stable and ten meaning least stable. 
These indicator scores are combined to create the overall Fragile State index score which 
is “interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a 
reduced score indicates an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater 
instability.”113 The highest overall index score is 120 as there are 12 indicators with a 
maximum limit of ten.  For example, in 2014, Finland was the most stable with a score of 
18.7 while South Sudan was the least stable with a score of 112.9. In 2005 and 2012, 
more than three indicators are listed because two or more indicators shared the same 
score. Identifying Bahrain’s most destabilizing pressures highlight target areas that 




Figure 1: Bahrain’s Fragile State Index Scores and Indicators 
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2013 62.9 SL, HR, GG 
2014 64.7 SL, HR, GG 
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HR   Human Rights and Rule of Law 
GG   Group Grievance  
FE     Factionalized Elites 
UED Uneven Economic Development 
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Bahrain’s fragile state score has overall decreased since 2005 with a major decline 
in 2007, which means that the country is more stable in 2014 than it was in 2005 despite 
a rise in instability since 2011.  To answer the question of what issues are the most 
destabilizing to Bahrain, the index has highlighted Bahrain’s top three indicators since 
2013, which are state legitimacy (SL), human rights (HR), and group grievances (GG). 
Another reoccurring indicator since 2005 are factionalized elites (FE) issues. These 
indicators will be further explained below as well as the threat they pose to the safety and 
security of U.S. bases. 
 
In 2013 and 2014, state legitimacy (SL) indicators involve issues with 




electoral process.114 There have been uprisings in the country as a result of Bahrain’s 
electoral process as the government has been criticized for corruption and 
gerrymandering voting districts.115 The Al-Khalifa regime created an Independent 
Commission of Inquiry (BICI) to investigate human right abuses following the excessive 
response to demonstrations in June 2011 that left seven protestors dead.116 The BICI 
called for a public forum in which reforms were raised pertaining to the COR’s political 
power, electoral boundaries procedures, and government corruption.117 Despite 
disapproval from some Shiite opposition groups on the forum and reform proposals, the 
BICI reforms were implemented in May 2012. 
 
Human rights and rule of law (HR) is the second ranking issue in Bahrain. HR 
indicators involve issues of civil liberties, human trafficking, incarceration, torture, 
executions, and etc.118 The large 2011 demonstrations in Bahrain that led to neighboring 
Sunni state intervention used excessive force killing protestors in the process.119 
Additionally, there has been instances of executions and torture that have caused 
uprisings as a Bahraini Court upheld “a sentencing to death by firing squad” of a 
Bangladesh citizen, and the Human Rights Watch and Department of State have made 
allegations that Bahraini security forces use torture and cruel punishment.120 
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Group grievance (GG) are the third ranking indicator and involves tension and 
violence between certain groups and involves issues of discrimination, sectarian or 
religious violence.121 As Shiites feel as though as they are not accurately represented 
within the government and continue to demand more democracy, tensions between the 
Sunni elites and Shiite majority grow. Discrimination against Shiites has caused tension 
as well. Another large and reoccurring issue from 2005 until 2012 is factionalized elites 
(FE), which involves power struggles and flawed elections.122 COR elections take place 
every four years, and have been “marked by substantial tension over perceived 
government efforts to prevent election of a Shiite majority.”123 
 
Discussion 
While Bahrain’s most destabilizing issues have been addressed, to what extent do 
they threaten the safety and security of U.S. bases? The increasing instability can threaten 
U.S. presence in the country as Al-Khalifa resistance groups use violence to challenge the 
regime. Not to mention the increasing violent clashes between police and protestors.124 
Some Shiite militant groups opposed to the regime include the (1) Bahraini Hezbollah, a 
Hezbollah branch that supports and takes orders from the Iranian government since 1980; 
(2) Saraya al-Ashtar, a Bahraini terrorist group that has claimed credit for over 20 
bombings against security personnel; (3) Saraya al-Muqawama al-Shabiya, or Popular 
Resistance Brigades, another terrorist group of Bahrain that has carried out terrorist 
attacks in malls, banks, airports, etc.; and (4) Saraya al-Mukhtar, although not listed as a 
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terror group, has claimed attacks on Bahrain security to include improved explosive 
device (IED) attacks.125 
There have been instances of terrorist attacks targeting U.S. military bases in 
Bahrain. For example, the Popular Resistance Brigades claimed responsibility for 
detonating an IED near the U.S. military base in Bahrain where the Fifth Fleet is 
headquartered.126  As non-state groups have targeted security forces and U.S. military 
installations, these groups’ use of such tactics can increase in severity and occurrence as 
Bahrain’s instability increases. Considering the multiple travel warnings issued by the 
Department of State that declare “growing swaths of the country as off limits to U.S. 
service members and their families amid reports of regular, violent clashes,”127 Bahrain’s 
instability and its housing of U.S. military bases should remain a concern of DOD and 
policymakers until tensions settle between the Al-Khalifa regime and its resistance. 
 
According to the Fragile State index, although Bahrain was more stable in 2014 
than in 2005, its fragility score has increased since 2011following Egypt’s overthrow of 
its ruler. Although Shiite and regime opposition groups have called for King Al-Khalifa 
to step down, American military experts have repeatedly stated the importance of 
maintaining a presence in Bahrain by ensuring that the current monarchy (the Khalifa 
family) is maintained.128 If maintaining the Khalifa monarchy is a necessity, not only has 
this chapter provided the most destabilizing issues within Bahrain but it has also provided 
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a ranking agenda that U.S. policymakers can consider in order to stabilize Bahrain and 
the Al-Khalifa regime.  U.S. policymakers should continue to push for Shiite-Sunni 
equality on issues such as state legitimacy, human rights, and group grievances that have 
had the largest impact on Bahrain’s rising instability. The U.S. can leverage its large 
military presence, security cooperation, and arms trade to better persuade the Al-Khalifa 
regime to enact significant reforms. The White House has been vocal in asking that the 
Bahraini regime engage in open dialogue with opposition groups. Although the BICI held 
a public forum, the main opposition group known as the Wifaq left the talks and did not 
participate.129 The U.S. should continue to push for talks between the regime and the 
Wifaq while using its trade arms trade as leverage. 
 
The U.S. government and human rights organizations have been active on 
Bahrain’s human rights issues even publically opposing Bahrain’s use of excessive force 
in the 2011 demonstrations and temporarily withheld arms sales to the government on 
weapons used protestors. American policymakers and human right organization should 
continue to publicize human rights violations and openly oppose the use of excessive 
force and torture. Additionally, the U.S. should push that the Bahraini government allow 
human rights organizations to continuously monitor its actions as the government has 
prevented groups such as the Human Rights Watch from working in the country.130 
 
Additionally, the Fragile State Index shows a rising fragility score every 
consecutive year since 2011, but the DOD continues to fund expansion projects for the 
                                                        
129 CRS. Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy (CRS Report 95-1013) 20. 
130 Bahrain: An Unfolding Human Rights Crisis. (2011, July 5). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 




NSA-Bahrain naval base.  Although it could be understood if DOD increased spending 
toward security projects, training, and weapons to strengthen against increasing 
instability, expanding its bases with new building such as dining facilities could be 
perceived as a misuse of tax dollars. Perhaps the DOD should consider holding off on 
non-essential construction projects in Bahrain with no relation to security until tensions 
between the regime and opposition blocs are eased. Domestic tensions could continue to 
worsen and make the country unsafe for America’s presence 
 
Conclusion 
Bahrain is one of America’s closest GCC allies as it hosts the Navy’s Fifth Fleet 
and provides a strategic location for American forces with its close proximity to Iran. It is 
a critical ally in securing American interests in oil, natural gas, and maritime trade in the 
Gulf region as well. Because the country houses ten American military facilities 
including the Naval headquarters NSA Bahrain and over 8,500 Americans, the stability of 
the country is vital as rising domestic tensions can increase the threat posed to U.S. bases 
inside the country. Looking to past situations in Yemen and the Philippines when the 
U.S. was forced out and the rising fragility in Bahrain, the possibility of increasing 
attacks targeting U.S. bases in Bahrain are a concern. Considering the rising instability in 
Bahrain, although better than it was in 2005, the DOD should strive to stabilize the 
country and continue to push that substantial political reforms are made by the Al-Khalifa 
regime to appease its majority opposition blocs before further expanding the currently 
large NSA-Bahrain Base. 
 45 
Chapter Three. The Threat of Foreign Fighters: An Assessment of 
Foreign Fighter Involvement in Terrorist Attacks in the United States  
 
“Thousands of foreigners—including Europeans and some Americans” have joined ISIS 
militants … these fighters, trained and battle-hardened, could return to their home 
countries and carry out deadly attacks.131” 
-President Barack Obama 
Introduction 
 
The alleged increasing threat of foreign fighters to the West has gained the 
attention of American news outlets and the agendas of many policymakers, to include 
President Obama. The primary concern with foreign fighters is the possibility that these 
individuals may return to their home countries after gaining combat training or war 
experience and engage in terrorist activity. The threat posed by western foreign fighters is 
certainly recognized by both sides, as terrorist groups see the advantage of these 
volunteers and repeatedly call for Westerners to assist in and support attacks against the 
West. For example, Mike Morell, former CIA Deputy Director, notes that the Khorasan 
group, Jabat al-Nusra’s operationally experienced member arm that contains 50-100 
operatives, focuses primarily on attacking the West.132 The group has “safe havens in 
Syria where they plan external attacks, construct and test improvised explosive devices, 
and recruit westerners to conduct operations” rather than helping efforts to topple the 
Assad regime; this played a major role in the recent U.S. decision to conduct the 
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September 22 strikes as policymakers aimed to prevent an imminent attack against the 
homeland by this group and other similar groups.133  
 
History shows that the influx of Western foreign fighters toward Muslim conflict 
is nothing new as a large number of Western individuals flocked toward Afghanistan in 
the 1980’s during the Soviet invasion. There is estimated to be at least 2,000 Western 
foreign fighters who’ve traveled to the conflict in Iraq and Syria, most of them in support 
of al Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State Organization (IS).134  While the number of western 
fighters who migrated toward Afghanistan in the 80’s had been the largest to date, there 
are now more Westerners in Syria and Iraq than there once were in Afghanistan.135 
American policymakers are concerned that foreign fighters will return home to carry out 
terrorist attacks in the U.S., but how likely is this to actually occur? This paper focuses on 
the question, “How likely is that foreign fighters can carry out successful terrorist attacks 
within the U.S.” and examines western foreign fighters involvement in terrorists’ plots 
and attacks in the U.S. It was found that the threat is overstated, as there was no western 





Before beginning this assessment, a definition of Western foreign fighter is 
critical in the understanding of this article. The term ‘western’ means “individuals 
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coming from the U.S., Canada, European Union States, Australia, and New Zealand.”136 
This chapter will focus primarily on individuals from the U.S to include U.S. citizens by 
birth, naturalization, as well as those individuals with legal residency status or who has 
resided in the states for over three years. Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism 
Research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, gives a comprehensive 
definition for foreign fighter as he distinguishing between domestic fighters and foreign 
fighters.137  Hegghammer defines domestic fighters as individuals who perpetrate or 
attempt to perpetrate violence in the West, while foreign fighters are individuals who 
leave or attempt to leave the West to fight somewhere else.138  He also states that foreign 
fighting includes any 
 “military activity (training or fighting), using tactic (terrorist or guerilla 
tactics), against an enemy (western or non-western)—so long as it occurs outside 
the West; co-ethic war volunteers, for example, American Iraqis going to Iraq, are 
counted as foreign fighters.”139  
This chapter will use Hegghammer’s definition of foreign fighters to access the threat 
posed by Islamic foreign fighters to America.  
 
As the Islamic State of the Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or the Islamic State 
Organization (IS) is the new current threat of 2014 with its successful terrorist attacks and 
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growing land occupation, there is a concern among policymakers that the organization 
will radicalize its growing and newly recruited western fighters with the group’s anti-
American ideology and order them to return home to carry out attacks. This, in turn, 
could result in a serious peril but the extent of this threat in the United States has yet to be 
explored. While ISIS or IS goes by multiple names, for the sake of consistency, the group 
will be referred to as the Islamic State Organization or IS throughout this paper.  
Additionally, the organization known as Al-Qaeda will be referenced and used in 
gathering and analyzing terrorist incidents in America. The group is significant when 
studying the trends of foreign fighters, as it has played a major role in the recruitment of 
fighters since the Soviet invasion in the 1980’s. When the term ‘Al Qaeda’ is used, it will 
reference both its direct affiliates, and indirect affiliates. Its direct affiliates include Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the 
Nusrah Front, and Al Shabaab.140   These four groups have been formally accepted by the 
group and have pledged allegiance to the group’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Al Qaeda’s 
indirect affiliates include the Islamic State Organization, Al Murabitoun, Boko Haram, 
Ansar al Sharia, and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis.141 These groups have not been formally 
accepted by al Zawahiri but may ”have organizational links or ideological similarities 
with Al Qaeda or its affiliates and pose a credible threat to U.S. interests.”142  
 
This chapter seeks to measure the involvement of western foreign fighters in 
terrorism within the U.S. as well as the lethality of these terrorist acts. It will also 
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examine jihadi-inspired terrorist attacks in the U.S. with foreign fighter involvement and 
their resulting casualties. While IS is relatively new and has yet to conduct any terrorist 
attacks within American borders, there is no available data on this aspect so al-Qaeda will 
be used as a case study. Assessing al-Qaeda’s foreign fighter involvement in terrorism 
sheds some light on the perceived threat that IS’ foreign fighters can potentially cause.   
 
But what exactly is considered terrorism involvement? While terrorism is the use 
of violence toward civilians for a political purpose, individuals can be involved in 
terrorism directly or indirectly. Direct involvement is the active participation in the 
terrorist activity (i.e. detonating the bomb) while indirect involvement is the facilitation 
or finance of terrorist activity.143 For this purpose of this examination, terrorist 
involvement will refer to both those actively involved in terrorist attacks as well as those 
who support attacks indirectly by way of recruitment or finance. Western foreign fighters 
with any known connections to terrorist attacks, whether it is providing material or 
financial support to attacks, will be evaluated. 
 
As key definitions have been explained, this chapter is separated into four parts. 
First, a literature review will follow that will explore current academic literature 
surrounding foreign fighters throughout history and the many theories that help to explain 
the increase of and reasons for foreign fighter occurrence, especially the Western foreign 
fighter. Second, a methodology section will measure Western foreign fighter involvement 
in terrorism within the U.S.  Third, the chapter will explain the research results pertaining 
to foreign fighter participation in attacks in the U.S. Fourthly, the chapter will discuss the 
                                                        










Currently, news sources continue to share concern on the increasing number of 
Syrian Western foreign fighters (or individuals from the West who have left or attempt to 
leave to fight in Syria), especially IS’ recruitment of these individuals, yet there is little 
academic literature or statistics that examine the probability of this threat to the United 
States. Although there is little open-source information on this topic, it is logical to say 
that the possibility of foreign fighters returning home to engage in terrorist activity is just 
that, possible, but very little literature actually attempts to observe just how likely this 
possibility may be. Most literature on western foreign fighters focuses on western society 
to include European Union states (EU), the U.S., Canada, Australia, and some others as a 
conglomerate but the threat of foreign fighters to the U.S., solely, is understudied. 
 
The number of foreign fighters that join Islamic conflict in the Middle East and 
Africa continues to rise and while some literature has observed the increase in foreign 
fighters over time, very few have attempted to explain the reasons behind this growth. 
Thomas Hegghammer, a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI), conducted a study on al-Qaida’s transnational empowerment in 
relation to the rise of foreign fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion.144 
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Hegghammer is a prominent expert of foreign fighter trends as his research reoccurs 
throughout a large portion of existing foreign fighter literature. 
 
Not only did Hegghammer emphasize the role that war volunteering played in a 
majority of al-Qaida operatives’ experience in basic militancy but he also emphasized 
how this volunteering was “ a stepping stone in individual involvement for more extreme 
forms of militancy,” as he says “when Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do 
not plot attacks in their home countries right away, but travel to a war zone first.”145 
Hegghammer focuses on Western Muslims (Muslim individuals from the previously 
mentioned western states) as they create the large majority of western foreign fighters 
who join Muslim conflicts abroad. Hegghammer found that through influential al-Qaida 
leaders, notably Abdallah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden, that foreign fighter and jihad 
doctrines were established that called for collective duty and Muslim obligation to fight 
whether residing in the local area of conflict or outside.146  This ideology of collective 
duty coupled with non-Muslim intervention in Muslim areas is a possible cause for 
heightened foreign fighters occurrence in Islamic conflict areas. In addition to the large 
number of foreign fighters who flocked toward Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, 
two other major conflict instances that attracted transnational fighters include the Bosnian 
conflict in the 1990’s and Somalia conflict in the 2000’s.   
 
Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewjin, a research assistant at the Centre for Terrorism 
and Counter-terrorism (CTC), challenges Hegghammer’s measurement of foreign fighter 
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involvement in terrorism as she argues that his original measurement of individuals 
labeled as foreign fighters was too broad and failed to differentiate between foreign 
fighters and foreign trainees. Van Zuijdewin holds that “individuals who go abroad to 
merely train for terrorist activity in the West should not be called foreign fighters.”147  
Her emphasis on the distinction between foreign fighters and foreign trainees narrows the 
number of individuals classified as foreign fighters in Hegghammer’s study and alters the 
measure that 1 out of 4 Western Muslim foreign fighters were involved in terrorist 
activity in Europe to 1 out of 11, making it significantly smaller.148 Jeanine’s distinction 
between foreign fighters and foreign trainees is not important for this study as it follows 
Hegghammer’s definition which includes both foreign fighter and foreign trainees as 
individuals engaged in foreign fighting.   
 
A study conducted by the CTC of the Leiden University in the Netherlands 
explored documented cases of known foreign fighters since 1980 and highlighted eight 
different paths that these returnees took after the conflict. Although there are various 
foreign fighter pathway theories throughout literature, this theory seems to be the most 
simple and comprehensive.  They note that their study is more anecdotal, as there is a 
lack of empirical data, and tracing a total or large portion of the returning fighters is 
nearly impossible.149 From their study, it was found that returning fighters have taken one 
of the eight paths to include: 
1. Death; 
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2. Staying in the country to become a resident and live in peace; 
3. Staying in the country and becoming involved in terrorist activity; 
4. Returning to home country and reintegrate; 
5. Returning to home country/or another western country and becoming involved 
in terrorist activity; 
6. Returning to a non-western country to continue to fight and remain committed 
to the global jihad; 
7. Traveling to a non-western country and becoming involved in terrorist 
activity; 
8. And traveling to a non-western country and peacefully reintegrating. 150 
 
Although these eight pathways have been identified, it remains unknown which pathway 
is more likely to occur as this project aimed toward identifying pathways. Examining the 
reasoning behind these different pathway choices can help governments “formulate more 
adequate policy responses and more specific threat assessments with regard to 
returnees… as it is shown that not all will come home to stage an attack, …although there 
is concern for the potential high number of returning Western foreign fighters from 
Syria.”151  
  
Looking to history and the Afghanistan attraction of foreign fighters in the 1980’s, there 
were a few cases of returning fighters with involvement in terrorist attacks in the U.S., 
although a large majority stayed in Afghanistan or continued jihad in Bosnia. John Berger 
gives a riveting account of Americans who fought in Afghanistan as well as those who 
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engaged in terrorist activity in or against the U.S after returning home; he estimated 
around 150 American foreign fighters fought alongside Afghans.152   
 
Out of the estimated 150 foreign fighters, Berger only found information on 30 
cases who returned to the U.S. Three were found to have become involved with terrorist-
related actions upon return.153 They were: 
 Clement Hampton-El was a key figure the World Trade Center Bombing of 
1993. 
 Wadih El Hage was involved in the U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998. 
 Daniel Boyd returned home to recruit his sons and was convicted of providing 
material support to terrorists in 2012.154  
 
Although Berger gives a great account of Afghanistan returned fighters who later 
became engaged in terrorist activity, little literature can be found that explores returned 
fighters from Bosnia and Somalia, specifically. There is little to no literature that 
compares jihadi- inspired terrorist attacks carried out by American foreign fighters post 
1980 to those with foreign fighter involvement. This chapter will strive to take on this 
gap. While there is an adequate amount of literature that analyzes the differing routes that 
foreign fighters take post conflict, very little literature exists that “aims at improving our 
understanding of how and why foreign fighters eventually take a certain pathway after 
the fight.”155 
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Threat of Foreign Fighters 
 
In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in the U.S., these returnees can cause a 
threat to America in other ways. Despite the possibility of foreign fighters conducting 
terrorist attacks, Jason Burke, author and journalist for The Guardian, notes that most 
volunteers are inexperienced in war fighting and require training to become a significant 
threat to trained troops.156 Foreign fighters can pose a threat to the U.S. by recruiting 
more Westerners to join, thereby prolonging the threat and possibility of these individuals 
targeting the West. After returning from volunteering or, in some cases, while 
volunteering, with the use of social media, these fighters can use their street cred to 
further recruit individuals and gather support for Islamic jihadists, notably al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates. This was the case with Omar Hammami, a radicalized convert from 
Alabama who joined al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, in Somalia. During the conflict, 
Hammami used the Internet, his experience, and his English speaking abilities to recruit 
an estimated 30 individuals to fight with the group.157 
 
The threat posed by foreign fighters as well as an examination of the perpetrators 
of terrorist attacks that occurred post 1991 in the United States will be studied. As the 
perceived threat of Western foreign fighter is high, an examination of these instances can 
provide a more accurate context in which this matter can be discussed. Not only will 
settling this confusion allow for more efficient allocations of American resources but it 
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could better frame the threat of foreign fighters and their potential to conduct terrorist 
activity in America and aid in the formulation of American policies to restore stability in 
Iraq or Syria. 
Of course, there is some criticism of the threat posed by foreign fighters, as Anne 
Stenerson, a research fellow of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, argues 
that foreign fighters become more “embedded in local communities,” rather than 
returning home.158 Despite this perspective, there are cases of foreign fighters returning 
home to conduct terrorist attacks. This study will focus on returnees who decide to 




Al Qaeda will be measured as a case study to help create a baseline to assess the 
risk level that IS can potentially pose as al Qaeda not only provides a well studied and 
seasoned history but also shares similar ideology to IS’ as well, despite their recent 
separation. For this reason, al Qaeda’s terrorist activity within America will be measured, 
as literature is more accessible on the group; it is also older with a strong history of 
drawing foreign fighters to its cause. This chapter will aim to measure al Qaeda 
successful and unsuccessful terrorist attacks within the United States and foreign fighter 
involvement in those attacks. Essentially, al Qaeda will be used to study the involvement 
of American foreign fighters in terrorist attacks within the states. 
 
                                                        
158 Quote. Anne Stenerson. (2011). Al Qaeda's Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of 
Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006. Studies In Conflict 





To measure the threat level of foreign fighters in America, a list was gathered of 
all al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist attacks that occurred in the U.S. between 1991 and 2013. 
There is nothing significant about 2013; this is a limitation of the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) used to gather terrorist attacks. Only terrorist incidents post 1991 are 
considered because this period signaled the end of the Cold War. Also, there is existing 
literature on foreign fighter activity in Afghanistan pre-1991 and jihadi attacks in the U.S. 
were rare prior to 1991.159 
 
As previously mentioned, the National Consortium for Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD) was used to extract the list of 
al Qaeda affiliated attacks. The GTD is an open source database with over 125, 000 
international events and is “currently the most comprehensive unclassified database on 
terrorist events in the world.”160 All information in the GTD database has been pulled 
from verified sources and is supervised by a panel of terrorism experts.161 The RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTD), a compilation of over 40,000 
global terrorist incidents, was also used as an additional form of verification for those 
found in the START database and to better ensure that no incidences were overlooked.162 
All instances were reviewed with additional sources and literature to verify these terrorist 
incidents. Additional research will also possibly shed light on the background of the 
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perpetrators involved in these incidents as well as their motivation, and reasons for 
involvement.  
 
When searching the GTD, specific search criteria was used which required that all 
attacks be aimed at attaining a political goal, have evidence of an intention to coerce a 
larger audience, and target civilians or non-combatants outside the context of legitimate 
warfare activities. It is important to note that all attacks toward military and law 
enforcement were excluded, as this study counts attacks that targeted civilians only.  The 
specific criterion used for GTD extraction of terrorist attacks carried out in the U.S. as 
well as those carried by al Qaeda is listed in Appendix B and Appendix C.  
 
In addition to measuring successful al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, documented 
unsuccessful attacks were observed as well with a list of unsuccessful and foiled terrorist 
plots from a 2013 Heritage Foundation study. There were 61 plots that occurred against 
the homeland after 9/11. The Heritage Foundation tracked post 9/11 terrorist plots against 
the states in an effort to study the evolving threat imposed to the security of the United 
States.163 Analyzing all 61 unsuccessful Islamic terrorist plots and attempts, each event 
was categorized based on involved perpetrators, terrorist affiliations, and most 
importantly, foreign fighter involvement; the aim of this is to find what proportion of 
unsuccessful plots were affiliated with al Qaeda and involved foreign fighter 
participation. 
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Successful Terrorist Attacks 
 
According to the START GTD, there were a total of 249 successful terrorist 
attacks that occurred in U.S between 1991 and 2013. There were 29 attacks in 2001 and 
22 attacks in 2003 until a significant decrease occurred after 2003 when it dropped to six 
attacks in 2004.  It began to peak again with 12 terrorists attacks in 2012. Figure 2 
displays the total number of successful terrorist attacks that occurred between 1991 and 
2013.  
 
Figure 2: Total Successful Terrorist Attacks 
 
Successful Attacks Involving Al-Qaeda 
 
 
According to the GTD, while there were 249 successful terrorist attacks that 
occurred in America, only four of these attacks involved perpetrators with ties to al-
Qaeda. All four attacks and perpetrators associated with the 9/11 attacks involved no 





claimed about 2,836 lives, not to mention the sheer amount of publicity the attacks 
received worldwide as the attacks were broadcasted over the media.  
Unsuccessful Terrorist Plots Involving Foreign Fighters 
As successful al Qaeda terrorist attacks have been examined to find foreign fighter 
involvement, al Qaeda’s attempted and/or unsuccessful terrorist attacks were reviewed as 
well to find any foreign fighter involvement. While there were 61 terrorist plots from 
2001 until 2013 against the United States, 54 of those plots were foiled by domestic and 
international law enforcement before any harm was caused. 18 of these Islamist plots 
were affiliated with al-Qaeda. After analyzing this study, eight plots were known to have 
western foreign fighter involvement to include: 
1. Richard Reid, a British citizen and supporter of al Qaeda who previously trained 
in Afghanistan before he attempted to ignite a shoe bomb on a flight from Paris to 
Miami in 2001.164 (This is a unique example but it is important to note that by 
definition, Reid is a Western foreign fighter. He is a British citizen who left to 
train in a non-Western country before returning to launch an attack in the United 
States (a Miami destined flight). 
2. Jose Padilla, affiliated with al Qaeda, previously trained in Pakistan with the 
group and received instructions to use a dirty bomb against the U.S. in 2002.165  
3. Lackawanna Six, a group of six American citizens of Yemeni descent who 
trained in Afghanistan with al Qaeda in 2002. All were convicted of supporting al 
Qaeda, served their time and are now free in New York.166 
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4. Uzir and Saifullah Paracha. Uzair Paracha, a Pakistani citizen with permanent 
U.S. residency was charged with providing material and financial support to al 
Qaeda and planned to bomb underground gas store storage tanks in Maryland in 
2003.167 His father, Saifullah Paracha, a resident alien of the U.S. is currently held 
at Guantanamo bay for providing al Qaeda with biological and chemical 
explosives.168 
5. Nuradin M. Abdi, a Somalian national affiliated with al Qaeda, resided in Ohio 
after he obtained fraudulent immigration documents in 2000.169 After requesting 
immigrant travel documents for Germany and Saudi Arabia, Abdi planned “to 
attend military style terrorist training camp in Ethiopia in hopes of carrying out 
jihad in the U.S.170 Abdi was charged in a plot to bomb a local Ohio shopping 
mall shortly after his return to the U.S. 
6. Hamid Hayat, an American citizen of Pakistani descent, previously trained at an 
Islamic terrorist training camp in Pakistan to carry out jihad in the U.S.171 He was 
found guilty of providing material support to terrorists and providing false 
statements to the FBI in 2005. 
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7. Najibullah Zazi, affiliated with al Qaeda, moved to the U.S from Pakistan when 
he was teen and became a naturalized American citizen.172 After training at an al 
Qaeda camp in Pakistan, he plotted to bomb New York City’s subway with four 
other individuals in 2009.173 
8. Faisal Shahzad, “a naturalized citizen from Pakistan attempted to detonate 
explosives in an SUV parked in Times Square in 2010…after receiving explosive 
training in Pakistan.”174 Although there are no known ties to al Qeada, Shahzad 
received training from the terrorist organization, Tehrik-e-Taliban.175 
 
Fortunately, all eight of these plots were either unsuccessful or foiled by law 
enforcement but all involved Western foreign fighter participants that threatened the 
national security of the U.S. Five of the eight foreign fighter involved plots are tied with 
al-Qaeda with the last recorded al Qaeda affiliated attempt occurring in September 2009. 
It is important to remember that this study was conducted in 2013 and does not account 
for any terrorist plots post 2013.  Unsurprisingly, there is not much literature that 
analyzes current Islamic terror plots post 2013 as classified restrictions and current 




                                                        










Not only is the Islamic State Organization growing financially and physically but 
the number of foreign fighters within their ranks continues to rise as well. But to what 
extent can this threaten the security of the United States? The results of this chapter not 
only assessed the likelihood of Western foreign fighters to carry out terrorist attacks in 
the U.S. but can also be used in gauging the threat posed by these experienced or jihadist-
inspired individuals. As this study adds to existing foreign fighter literature and creates a 
foundation that new explorations on the threat of American foreign fighters can be made, 
it finds that western foreign fighters have been unable to carry out terrorist attacks from 
1991 until 2013. Therefore the chance that western foreign fighters can successfully carry 
out terrorist attacks in the U.S. is less likely to occur based on the findings of this study, 
which are discussed further below. 
Successful Attacks  
 
Comparing the number of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks and fatalities since 1991 
against other terrorist groups presents some rather interesting results. Although the study 
of successful attacks lacked any trace of foreign fighter involvement, its results proved 
useful despite a lack of foreign fighter connection. There were 249 successful attacks 
where 3,213 individuals were killed. Of all 249 attacks, only 4 were affiliated with al 
Qaeda, yet these 4 attacks claimed 2,836 lives and are responsible for the large majority 
of terrorist fatalities post 1991within the U.S. That means that although al-Qaeda is 
responsible for about 1 out of every 62 attacks post 1991, the group can claim about 88% 






Interesting and independent of the 9/11 attacks, the only other terrorist attack that 
resulted in significant casualties is the Oklahoma City bombing that occurred on April 16, 
1995 and resulted in 168 casualties.176 In addition to the significant threat of al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates, the threat of homegrown extremists such as Timothy McVeigh should 
continue to be assessed. The majority of terrorist attacks that occurred between 1991 and 
2013 were caused by individual extremists and resulted in relatively low casualties with 
the exception of McVeigh’s bombing.  
 
Unsuccessful Attacks and Plots 
 
In September 2010, before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that  
“the range of Al Qaeda’s core, affiliated, allied, and inspired U.S. citizens and 
residents plotting against the homeland during the past year suggests the threat 
against the West has become more complex and underscores the challenges of 
identifying and countering a more diverse array of homeland plotting.”177  
 
This assessment still holds to be true with 61 terrorist plots uncovered from 9/11 
until December of 2013. Although domestic and international law enforcement prevented 
the majority of these attacks from occurring, attempted and planned attacks are still 
important because as it has been shown, it takes only one successful attempt to cause 
massive casualties and significant infrastructure damage. This asymmetrical tactic allows 
                                                        
176 Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing. (n.d.). Retrieved January 1, 2014, from 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing 
 
177 Michael Leiter. (2010). Nine years after 9/11: Confronting the terrorist threat to the 






terrorists and homegrown extremists to cause significant damage with only one 
successful attack and minimum participants so law enforcement and intelligence 
communities should remain vigilant.   
 
 
Unlike successful terrorist attacks, there were eight plots that involved the 
participation of foreign fighters while a small number of the remaining cases involved 
individuals who aspired to be foreign fighters which illustrates that the concern for 
possible Western foreign fighter involvement in attacks targeting the states is well-
placed. Confidence in our security system is strengthened when one sees that all attacks 
that involved foreign fighters where foiled but the fact that involvement exists supports 
the maintenance of caution and surveillance of returning and aspiring Islamist foreign 
fighters. Furthermore, while there were only eight plots that involved foreign fighters, 
over half of them involved individual perpetrators without any affiliation to any official 
terrorist organization; this illustrates that the increasing rise of homegrown terrorism may 
play a more significant threat than returning foreign fighters as these individuals are not 




While the threat of foreign fighters is understood that they can use their training 
and fighting experience to conduct terrorist attacks, not many studies focus on this threat 
to the United States despite the emerging concern of American news sources and policy 
agendas. The Islamic State Organization has managed to create a strong American 





Qaeda’s footsteps as al Qaeda garnished large foreign fighters in the 1980’s. Being a 
more seasoned organization, there is more available literature on al Qaeda which 
provides a foundation for the study of Western foreign fighters and their threat to the 
United States which can be referenced when assessing the threat and policy options 
toward IS.  
 
Although there has been no instance of Western foreign fighter involvement in 
successful al Qaeda attacks within America post 1991, there have been numerous 
instances of foreign fighter involvement in terrorist plots against America and its citizens 
which goes to show that Dennis Blair, previous Director for National Intelligence, was 
accurate in his 2010 statement that although progress has been made against the terrorist 
threat to the American homeland, the danger is not gone.178 He assessed that we 
 “ face a persistent terrorist threat from Al Qaeda and potentially others who share 
its anti-Western ideology. A major terrorist attack may emanate from either 
outside or inside the United States.”179  
 
The threat that Blair spoke of may possibly be homegrown radicalized individuals as an 
increasing number of terrorist attacks and plots are attributed to these individuals. 
Homegrown attacks outnumbered instances of attacks carried out by Western foreign 
fighters but their lethality falls short of attacks affiliated with al Qaeda and the like. 
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Although al Qaeda’s capabilities to execute attacks on the scale of 9/11 have been 
significantly reduced, the emergence of similar groups with similar ideologies and goals 
ensure that the threat lives on. Al Qaeda managed to induce a massively destructive and 
fatal attack on 9/11 with minimal individuals and resources which supports that the 
United States should maintain or enhance its preventive law enforcement and intelligence 
capabilities to continue protecting the homeland. The Heritage Foundation said it best 
that: 
  “61 thwarted attacks are all examples of why continued security, prevention, and 
intelligence regarding counterterrorism are so vital to the safety and prosperity of 
the U.S. and its citizens. This is yet another reminder to the U.S. government that 
counterterrorism strategies must continue to evolve in order to remain one step 
ahead of the enemy.”180 
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Appendix B— Total Terrorist Attacks in the United States  
 
Global Terrorism Database Search Criteria Used- Results- 249 attacks 
SEARCH CRITERIA: 
Years: (between 1991 and 2013) 
Criteria I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. Would you 
like your search results to require Criterion I to be met? (yes) 
Criteria II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to 
a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. Would you like your search results to require 
Criterion II to be met? (yes) 
Criteria III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be 
outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against 
deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). Would you like your search results to require Criterion 
III be met? (yes) 
Only incidents where there is essentially no doubt of terrorism 
Including only successful attacks. 
 
Targets: (Business; Government (General); Airports and Aircraft; Government (Diplomatic); Educational 
Institution; Food or Water Supply; Journalists & Media; Maritime; Private Citizens & Property; Religious 
Figures/Institutions; Telecommunication; Tourists; Transportation; Utilities) 
Country: (United States) 








Appendix C— Total Al Qaeda Affiliated Terrorist Attacks in the United 
States 
 
Global Terrorism Database Search Criteria Used- Results- 4 attacks 
SEARCH CRITERIA: 
Years: (between 1991 and 2013) 
Criteria I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. Would you 
like your search results to require Criterion I to be met? (yes) 
Criteria II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to 
a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. Would you like your search results to require 
Criterion II to be met? (yes) 
Criteria III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be 
outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against 
deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). Would you like your search results to require Criterion 
III be met? (yes) 
Only incidents where there is essentially no doubt of terrorism 
Including only successful attacks. 
Perpetrators: (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qa`ida; Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qa`ida in the 
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM); Al-Shabaab; Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant) 
Targets: (Business; Government (General); Airports and Aircraft; Government (Diplomatic); Educational 
Institution; Food or Water Supply; Journalists & Media; Maritime; Private Citizens & Property; Religious 
Figures/Institutions; Telecommunication; Tourists; Transportation; Utilities) 
Country: (United States) 









The goal of this broad thesis portfolio is to gain a better understanding and scope 
of the many perceived threats posed toward the United States from the Middle Eastern 
region. The first chapter focuses on the effect of U.S. coercive policy on Iran’s nuclear 
program as its nuclear ambitions have caused concern among international policymakers. 
The second chapter examines Bahrain’s most destabilizing issues to help assess its threat 
to the security of U.S. bases, notably the U.S. Naval Headquarters. The third chapter 
measures the threat of western foreign fighters to carry out terrorist attacks in the U.S as 
concern grows on the number of Westerners joining the fight in Middle East. The 
findings of this portfolio include the assertion that more coercive policies toward Iran 
make it more aggressive against the U.S. and more supportive of its program; and that 
Bahrain’s most destabilizing issues pertain to state legitimacy, human rights and the rule 
of law, and group tensions. These major destabilizing issues increase the likelihood that 
Al-Khalifa opposition groups continue to target U.S. security personnel and bases. It was 
also found that the threat of western foreign fighters carrying out terrorist attacks in the 
U.S. is overstated. 
 
While the Middle East is always a trendy topic, this thesis portfolio expanded on 
the existing literature that focuses on threats from the region and provides a helpful 
understanding on the threats of rogue nations, unstable ally regimes, and terrorism. This 
portfolio is also useful when making adjustments to policy decisions that pertain to the 





the negative effect that coercive American policies have on Iran, how Bahrain’s rising 
instability issues threaten the security of America’s expanding naval headquarters, and 
the overemphasized threat of foreign fighters successfully carrying out terrorist attacks in 
the states. 
Each of the chapters was limited in specific areas and could be enhanced with 
future research. These limitations include the lack of information on Iran’s domestic 
political affairs, which is something that could potentially change with acceptance of the 
nuclear deal and the allowance of nuclear inspectors into the country. As sanctions are 
lifted, a growing economy and more influential Iran could reconsider its closed society. 
Anther research limitation experienced was the lack of public information on of 
American bases abroad. Initially, the second chapter was going to focus on both Kuwait 
and Bahrain as both countries have MNNA designation but the lack of information on 
Kuwait’s bases made research cumbersome. The third chapter encountered research 
limitations on past foreign fighter information. There is very little literature that observes 
the possibility of foreign fighters returning home. While there may be no easy 
methodology to assess the likelihood of foreign fighter action, it is even more difficult to 
track foreign fighters. 
 
Overall, the threat of the rogue nation is valid as states such as Iran continue to 
seek nuclear capabilities that transcend the limitations of the NPT.  Until a cooperative 
and verifiable deal exists with Iran or the use of brute force completely eliminates the 
possibility of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, this rogue nation will continue to be 





can be mitigated with the use of long-term cooperation with Iran as U.S. policymakers 
hesitate to take direct military action in the Middle East after the invasion of the Iraq. 
 
The threat of unstable ally regimes is valid as close GCC allies such as Bahrain 
experience increasing state fragility due to tensions over regime legitimacy, human rights 
and rule of law, and sectarianism. While the U.S. continues to expand its bases there, it 
needs to consider past instances of terrorist activity occurring nearby that can threaten the 
safety and security of its presence. Although Bahrain has not reached inhospitable 
conditions, the DOD should also reconsider new construction projects until the Al-
Khalifa regime makes significant reforms to appease its large opposition blocs.  
 
The threat of terrorism is valid, although the threat of foreign fighters to carry out 
terrorist attacks in America has been overstated in the media and by policymakers. While 
there is no instance of foreign fighter involvement in terrorist attacks within the U.S. 
between 1991 and 2013, there were eight unsuccessful terrorist plots with foreign fighter 
involvement signaling the need for continued surveillance by law enforcement and 
intelligence entities. According to the GTD, there is larger threat posed by 
domestic/home-grown actors rather than international terrorism as homegrown actors 
have carried out more successful attacks. 
 
The primary takeaways from this portfolio include the possibility that the threat to 
the U.S. from the Middle East may be somewhat amplified in the news media. Iran has 





with the U.S. but the current nuclear deal agreement, although awaiting acceptance by the 
U.S. congress and Iranian counterparts is a path forward for potential future cooperation 
as well as an example of cooperation on an issue that was seen as a critical security 
concern for Iran. Clearly the threat of Iran is a real issue, however a more cooperative and 
negotiable strategy with the country could prove useful. 
 
Second while instability in the region in well known, the steadily increasing 
instability in Bahrain seems to have little effect on DOD base expansion projects. 
Although the DOD has contingency sites for its operations in Bahrain in the case that 
conditions become too inhospitable, it continues to fund construction projects on its naval 
base and rely on the relationship with King Al-Khalifa despite protests calling for him to 
step-down. The U.S. should continue to support and aim to stabilize issues with state 
legitimacy, human rights, and group grievances to better ensure that the Bahrain remains 
stable to hold its expanding bases. 
 
Third, clearly the threat of foreign fighters carrying out terrorist attacks in the 
U.S. is a real issue, however it is not the most acute concern for America today. The 
media overstates the threat of foreign fighters committing terrorist attacks within the 
states as history shows a failure of these individuals to successfully carry out attacks 
within the borders although there have been attempts. Policymakers should ensure the 
public that decisions are based on historical and factual information and that tax dollars 
are spent on high-priority threats. There should be more attention given to the issue of 
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